

Secure Vehicular Communication Systems

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Related concepts and keywords

Vehicular networks; VANET; System security; Network security

Definition

Security for Vehicular Communication (VC) systems comprises architectures and specific schemes to manage faulty behavior of the VC system entities, which are computing, sensing and communication devices integrated in vehicles and the road-side.

Background

After the deployment of automated toll collection or active road-signs, Vehicular Communication (VC) systems are envisioned as the future technology for improved traffic efficiency and safety. VC systems will comprise *nodes*, in other words, vehicle-mounted and Road-Side infrastructure Units (RSUs), equipped with on-board sensory, processing, and wireless communication modules. Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication can enhance transportation safety and efficiency, as well as infotainment. For example, VC systems can send warnings about environmental hazards (e.g., ice on the pavement), traffic and road conditions (e.g., emergency braking, congestion, or construction sites), and local (e.g., tourist) information.

The unique features of VC are a double-edged sword: a rich set of tools will be available, but a formidable set of abuses and attacks will then become possible. Consider, for example, an attacker that “contaminates” large portions of the vehicular network with false information: A single compromised vehicle can transmit false hazard warnings that can then be taken up by all vehicles in both traffic streams; or a tampered vehicle can forge messages to masquerade as an emergency vehicle to mislead other vehicles to slow down and yield; or a different type of attacker can deploy a number of receivers and record messages transmitted by the vehicles, especially safety beacons that report the vehicle’s location, in order to track a vehicle’s location and transactions and to infer private information about its driver and passengers.

It is clear that to thwart such attacks, security and privacy-enhancing mechanisms are necessary; in fact, they are a prerequisite for deployment. Otherwise VC systems could make anti-social and criminal behavior easier, in ways that would actually jeopardize the benefits of their deployment. This has been recently well understood in academia, the industry, and among authorities; and a number of concerted efforts have been undertaken to design security architectures for VC systems.

Adversary Model: VC system entities could deviate from the implemented protocol definitions. Such *faulty* or *adversarial* behavior could be the result of rogue versions of the protocols built by attackers, and modifications of the functionality of the VC system nodes; by tampering either with the on-board software and/or the hardware, or even because of VC software corruption by malicious software (e.g., viruses, trojans, etc., usually termed as malware). In general, many adversarial nodes can be present, often acting individually; or possibly in collusion, coordinating their actions. It is reasonable to assume that at any time and location only a few adversaries are likely to be physically present. This does not preclude a group of adversarial nodes surrounding a correct one, but such a situation would be rare. Of course, adversarial behavior can be passive: The attackers deploy or control a possibly large number of devices that collect VC messages and thus information on vehicles and system users.

Security Requirements: Without considering specific applications and protocols, a list of general security requirements are identified. *Message authentication and integrity*, to protect messages from alteration and allow receivers to corroborate the node that created the message. If necessary, *entity authentication* can provide evidence of the sender *liveness*, that is, the fact it generated a message recently. To prevent a sender from denying having sent a message, *non-repudiation* is needed. Furthermore, *access control* and *authorization* can determine what each node is allowed to do in the network, in terms of the implemented system functionality. *Confidentiality* can keep message content secret from unauthorized nodes.

Related to information hiding, *privacy and anonymity* are required, at least at the level of protection achieved before the advent of VC systems. In general, VC systems should not disclose or allow inferences on private user information. The identity of a vehicle performing a VC-specific action (e.g., transmitting a message) should be concealed, and an observer should be unable to determine which vehicle performed an action and should be unable

to link any two actions by the same vehicle. But transportation safety applications need to correlate locations of a vehicle over a short period (e.g., to warn about a collision). Thus, a less stringent requirement is considered: messages produced by a node over a protocol-selectable period of time τ can be linked, but any two messages generated at times t_1, t_2 such that $t_2 > t_1 + \tau$ cannot. The shorter τ is, the fewer the linkable messages are, and the harder to trace a node becomes.

Along with privacy enhancing technologies, it is required that any VC-specific action can be linked to the specific related node in order to attribute *liability*, for example, in the case of an accident. Finally, *availability* is also sought, so that VC systems can remain operational even in the presence of faults and can resume normal operation after the removal of the faulty nodes. Another significant dimension is that of *non-cryptographic security*, including the determination of data *correctness* or *consistency*.

Theory and Applications

Security Architecture for VC Systems: Basic Elements

Secure VC systems, illustrated in Fig. 1, will rely on multiple *Certification Authorities* (CAs), each managing the *long-term* identities and credentials for nodes registered in its *region* (e.g., canton or state). Each node is uniquely identified, and it holds one or more private-public key pairs and certificates. The CA attests to the attributes of each registered node, according to its capabilities and roles in the system. The CAs are responsible for *evicting* nodes from the system, for administrative or technical reasons, if needed. The CAs interact infrequently with nodes, utilizing RSUs as a gateway.

The basic technique for nodes to *secure communication* is to digitally sign messages, after attaching a time-stamp and the signer's location and certificate to the message. This way, modification, forgery, replay, and relay attacks can be defeated. The relay attacks relate to secure neighbor discovery, which is possible precisely because safety beacons can include the time and location at the point they are sent across the wireless medium. The originator or relaying nodes can sign beacons, multi-hop flooded, and position-based multi- or uni-casted messages in different ways.

To provide both security and a degree of anonymity, long-term keys and credentials are *not* used to secure communication. Rather, the approach of *pseudonymity* or *pseudonymous authentication* is used. Each vehicle is equipped with multiple certified public keys (pseudonyms) that do not re-




Figure 1: Abstract View of a Secure Vehicular Communication System.

veal the node identity. It obtains those pseudonyms from a trusted third party, a *pseudonym provider*, by proving it is registered with a CA. Then, the vehicle uses each pseudonym and private key for at most for τ seconds, the pseudonym lifetime, and then discards it. Messages signed under the same pseudonym can be trivially linked, but messages signed under different pseudonyms cannot.

Security Architecture for VC Systems: Additional Elements

Hardware Security: A trusted computing base, termed the Hardware Security Module (HSM) in the SeVeCom architecture, has tamper resistant properties, and it consists of a CPU, non-volatile memory, a built-in clock, an I/O interface, and a built-in battery. Its main functions are for private key cryptographic operations and provision of trustworthy time-stamping.

Revocation: Certificates of faulty nodes or compromised cryptographic keys have to be revoked, to prevent damage to the VC system. Revocation can be decided by the CA for administrative or technical reasons. A distributed protocol can be locally executed to collect evidence of misbehavior, identify wrong-doers and then exclude them from the local VC operation. The fundamental revocation mechanism is the distribution of *Revocation Lists (RLs)*. Sparse road-side infrastructure, with RSUs placed kilometers apart

and transmitting the RL at a few kbps, suffices for all vehicles to obtain an RL of hundreds of kilobytes over an average commute period.

Data Trustworthiness: Traditionally, if the sender of a message is trusted, then the content of the message is trusted as well. This notion is valid for long-lived, static trust relationships, but in VC systems there is often no ground for similar approaches. Moreover, to determine their trustworthiness, interaction with possibly adversarial data senders is hard due to the large-scale and fast changing topology of VC networks. It is thus necessary to assess the *trustworthiness of data per se*. The combination of multiple pieces of evidence or their absence allow nodes to decide on-the-fly on the trustworthiness of data, as obtained by other nodes in the VC system.

Secure Localization: Location information is critical for VC systems, basically for all safety applications but also for position-based information dissemination. The determination of a node's own position is paramount, with Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) playing already a central role. However, the adversary can interfere, injecting forged or replayed navigation messages, and manipulate the location of the victim nodes. Defense mechanisms can allow receivers to detect adversarial GNSS transmissions and reject false location information. Alternatively, other dedicated infrastructure could be deployed to provide secure localization. To defend against adversarial nodes that falsely report their position, data consistency checks or secure position verification techniques could be used.

Open Problems

Recent developments provide mature and deployable solutions for secure VC systems, although without addressing all issues. Three main future directions are briefly discussed here. For more information on secure and privacy enhancing VC systems, their performance and effectiveness, and ongoing and future research, two recent articles are recommended as additional reading.

Large-scale experimentation: Benchmarks, implementation of secure VC software, large-scale simulations, and field demonstrations show that secure VC is practical. With the appropriate design, secure VC systems can be as effective as their unsecured counterparts, which do impose the security overhead but are not an option for future deployment. Nonetheless, large-scale experimentation with any type (secure or not) of VC system has yet to be performed. Large-scale test-beds for a thorough validation of the system will be beneficial towards secure VC system deployment.

Integration of VC systems with other systems: VC systems will closely interact and often be integrated with other systems. On the one hand, *commodity devices*, such as mobile phones, iPods, or (portable) navigation systems, would be used inside the vehicle and often be connected to the vehicle electronics. On the other hand, *cellular, WiFi, mesh, and wireless sensor networks* could be used for various services to VC nodes (e.g., internet connectivity, local environmental information). Security solutions that consider explicitly this integration would be necessary.

Privacy: Existing solutions protect location privacy against adversaries with relatively limited physical presence. But dedicated adversaries, with knowledge of the geographical area and traffic and possibly other “off-line” information, could identify user trajectories in their surveillance area. Other systems integrated with the VC systems may also “leak” private information. Worse even, infrastructure such as the closed circuit TV cameras installed already in many cities, might render privacy enhancing mechanisms for VC largely irrelevant. A careful investigation of all these aspects is needed to determine the level of privacy users can expect.

Recommended Reading

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