

KTH Electrical Engineering

Secure and Privacy-enhancing Location-based Services

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Abstract


Location-based Services (LBSs) provide convenient features offering valuable services to users. However, the information disclosed through each request We are concerned with harms user privacy. honest-but-curious LBS servers which could, by collecting requests, track users and infer additional sensitive user data. This is the motivation of *MobiCrowd*, a *decentralized* location privacy protection scheme for LBSs: users hide themselves from the LBS server, while still getting useful information from their peers. However, such an open data sharing system needs to be secured: users should be prevented from manipulating the shared data. We address exactly this problem, by proposing security enhancements for *MobiCrowd* while preserving privacy.

System Model

MobiCrowd [1, 2]

• Basic ideas

- No need for an anonymization TTP
- Reliance on peers
- -Contact the LBS server only when absolutely necessary
- -Easy & Simple to implement
- Scheme on the client side
- -Cache signed responses received from the LBS server
- -Query neighbors (peers) first; query the LBS server if the responses from the neighbors do not meet the client requirements/needs




Our Improved Solution

- Client-to-LBS/client-to-client authentication in a privacy-preserving manner
- Low complexity implementation; applicable to resource-constrained devices
- Transparency for LBS servers
- Benefit: Increased user/client protection; thus, higher motivation for user participation

Next Steps

- Security & Privacy analysis
- Performance evaluation
- Integration with incentive schemes



- User participation through mobile devices or On-board Units (OBUs) in vehicles
- Communication with LBS servers through different types of network connections
- Peer-to-peer communication over an ad-hoc network


Problem Statement

• Assumptions:

- -LBS servers are *honest-but-curious*; they follow the protocols, but they may harm user privacy by profiling or de-anonymizing them.
- -Introduction of a Trusted Third Party (TTP) for query anonymization merely transfers the problem from the LBS server to the TTP.

How to Strengthen MobiCrowd?

- authentication • Pseudonymous instead of authentication with long-term credentials in order to hide the client identity from the LBS server
- Client-to-client authentication to prevent abuse from peers
- Accountability for peers to protect the system from misbehaving clients



References

- [1] R. Shokri, P. Papadimitratos, G. Theodorakopoulos, and J.-P. Hubaux. Collaborative location privacy. In *IEEE* International Conference on Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems (MASS), Valencia, Spain, October 2011.
- [2] R. Shokri, G. Theodorakopoulos, P. Papadimitratos, E. Kazemi, and J.-P. Hubaux. Hiding in the mobile crowd: Location privacy through collaboration. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 11(3):266–279, May 2014.
- [3] N. Alexiou, M. Laganà, S. Gisdakis, M. Khodaei, and P. Papadimitratos. Vespa: Vehicular security and privacy-preserving architecture. In Proceedings of the ACM workshop on Hot topics on wireless network security and privacy (HotWiSec), Budapest, Hungary, April 2013.
- S. Gisdakis, Alexiou, M. Laganà, and Towards a secure and Papadimitratos. privacy-preserving multi-service vehicular architecture. In IEEE International Symposium and Workshops on World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM), Madrid, Spain, June 2013.

• Objectives:

- -Disclose as little information as possible to the LBS server.
- -Ensure users obtain useful responses to their queries.

Requirements

- Communication Integrity, Authentication and Confidentiality
- Access Control and Authorization
- Anonymity and Unlinkability
- Non-repudiation and Accountability
- Availability and Scalability

- Client registration with a Long-term Certification Authority (LTCA)
- Ticket and pseudonym acquisition through steps 1-4 [3, 4]
- Pseudonymous authentication for queries
- Pseudonym resolution in case of misbehavior (conditional anonymity)