A Cyber Security Study of a SCADA
Energy Management System: Stealthy
Deception Attacks on the State Estimator

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Abstract: In this paper we analyze the cyber security of state estimators in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems for energy management systems (EMS) operating the power network. Current EMS state estimation algorithms have bad data detection (BDD) schemes to detect outliers in the measurement data, based on high measurement redundancy. Although these methods can detect a set of basic cyber attacks, they may fail in the presence of an intelligent attacker. We explore the latter by considering scenarios where stealthy deception attacks are performed by sending false information to the control center. We begin by presenting a recent framework that characterizes the attack as an optimization problem with the objective specified through a security metric and constraints corresponding to the attack cost. The framework is used to conduct realistic experiments on a state-of-the-art SCADA EMS software for a power network example with 14 substations, 27 buses, and 40 branches. To the authors' best
knowledge, this is the first such experimental study. The results indicate how state estimators
for power networks can be made more resilient to cyber security attacks.

Keywords: Systems Security; Energy Management Systems; Power System; State Estimation.

1. INTRODUCTION

Examples of critical infrastructures in our society are the power, the gas and the water supply networks. These infrastructures are operated by means of complex supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, which collect measurement data from remote terminal units (RTUs) installed in the substations, and deliver the measurement data to the central master station located at the control center. The measurement data is usually transmitted through unencrypted communication channels, making these critical infrastructures vulnerable to cyber attacks, see Giani et al. [2009], Cárdenas et al. [2008]. For a more recent example that also received considerable media attention, see Symantech [2010].

SCADA systems for power networks are complemented by a set of application specific software, usually called energy management systems (EMS). Modern EMS provide information support for a variety of applications related to power network monitoring and control. The power network state estimator (SE) is an online application that uses redundant measurements and a network model to provide the EMS with an accurate state estimate at all times. The SE has become an integral tool for EMS, for instance for contingency analysis (CA) which, based on the state estimate, identifies the most severe consequences in case of hypothetical equipment outages. A simple schematic picture of the SCADA system and EMS is shown in Fig. 1, with measurements denoted by $z$. Several cyber attacks on SCADA systems operating power networks have been reported, see The Wall Street Journal [2009] and CBSNews [2009], and major blackouts, such as the August 2003 Northeast U.S. blackout, are due to the misuse of the SCADA systems, see U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force [2004]. As discussed in Giani et al. [2009], there are also several vulnerabilities in the SCADA system architecture, including the direct tampering of RTUs, communication links from RTUs to the control center, and the IT software and databases in the control center.

Our work analyzes the cyber security of the SE in the SCADA system of a power network. In current implementations of SE algorithms, there are bad data detection (BDD) schemes designed to detect random outliers in the measurement data based on high measurement redundancy. However, these methods may fail in the presence of an intelligent attacker. For instance, it is well known that for so-called multiple interacting bad data, the BDD system can fail to detect and locate the faulty measurements, see Monticelli [1999], Abur and Exposito [2004]. That an attacker can exploit this fact has been pointed out in several recent papers, see Liu et al. [2009], Sandberg et al. [2010], Bobba et al. [2010]. In these papers, it is assumed that the attacker has an accurate linear model of the power grid, and the undetectability of certain corruptions $a$, see

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The main practical contribution of this paper is to test how sensitive a state-of-the-art SCADA system SE is to stealthy deception attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such experimental study on real software. Maybe somewhat surprisingly, for the cases we have studied, the attacks indeed pass undetected for very large corruptions $a$. This study is important because it shows the simplifying assumptions used in the previously mentioned studies indeed are valid. However, our analysis also shows that it is possible to make these attacks much more difficult to perform by allocating new sensors, or by securing some of them. Secure sensor allocation has also been discussed in Bobba et al. [2010] and Dán and Sandberg [2010]. The main theoretical contribution of this paper is the characterization of operating condition changes for which stealthy attacks remain valid and the extension of the attacker model to include constraints regarding pseudo-measurements and saturation limits.

The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical concepts behind state estimation in power networks. Results from previous work are used in Section 3 to develop the analysis framework and some novel considerations regarding limitations of linear attack policies are also given. Section 4 contains the main contribution of this paper, the description and results of practical experiments conducted in a state-of-the-art SCADA/EMS software using the previously mentioned framework. The conclusions are presented in Section 5.

2. PRELIMINARIES

In this section we introduce the power network models and the theory behind the SE and BDD algorithms.

2.1 Measurement model

For an $N$-bus electric power network, the $n = 2N - 1$ dimensional state vector $x$ is $(\theta^T, V^T)^T$, where $V = (V_1, \ldots, V_N)$ is the vector of bus voltage magnitudes and $\theta = (\theta_2, \ldots, \theta_N)$ vector of phase angles. This state vector is the minimal information needed to characterize the operating point of the power network. Without loss of generality, we have considered bus 1 to be the reference bus, hence all phase-angles are taken relatively to this bus and $\theta_1 = 0$. The $m$-dimensional measurement vector $z$ can be grouped into two categories: (1) $z_P$, the active power flow measurements $P_i$ from bus $i$ to $j$ and active power injection measurement $P_i$ at bus $i$, and (2) $z_Q$, the reactive power flow measurements $Q_{ij}$ from bus $i$ to $j$, reactive power injection measurement $Q_i$ and $V_i$ voltage magnitude measurement at bus $i$. The neighborhood set of bus $i$, which consists of all buses directly connected to this bus, is denoted by $N_i$. The power injections at bus $i$ are described by

$$P_i = V_i \sum_{j \in N_i} V_j (G_{ij} \cos(\theta_{ij}) + B_{ij} \sin(\theta_{ij}))$$

$$Q_i = V_i \sum_{j \in N_i} V_j (G_{ij} \sin(\theta_{ij}) - B_{ij} \cos(\theta_{ij}))$$

and the power flows from bus $i$ to bus $j$ are described by

$$P_{ij} = V_i^2 (g_{ni} + g_{ij}) - V_i V_j (g_{ij} \cos(\theta_{ij}) + b_{ij} \sin(\theta_{ij}))$$

$$Q_{ij} = -V_i^2 b_{ni} - V_i V_j (g_{ij} \sin(\theta_{ij}) - b_{ij} \cos(\theta_{ij}))$$

where $\theta_{ij} = \theta_i - \theta_j$ is the phase angle difference between bus $i$ and $j$, $g_{ni}$ and $b_{ni}$ are the shunt conductance and susceptance of this bus, $g_{ij}$ and $b_{ij}$ are the conductance and susceptance of the branch from bus $i$ to $j$, and $Y_{ij} = G_{ij} + jB_{ij}$ is the $ij$th entry of the nodal admittance matrix. More detailed formulas relating measurements $z$ and state $x$ may be found in Abur and Exposito [2004].

Assuming that the model parameters and the network topology are exact, the nonlinear measurement model for state estimation is defined by

$$z = h(x) + \epsilon,$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where $h(\cdot)$ is the $m$-dimensional nonlinear measurement function that relates measurements to states and is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, $\epsilon = (\epsilon_1, \ldots, \epsilon_m)^T$ the zero mean measurement error vector, and usually $m \gg n$ meaning that there is high measurement redundancy. Here $\epsilon$ are independent Gaussian variables with respective variances $\sigma^2_i$ indicating the relative uncertainty about the $i$-th measurement and thus we have $\epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(0, R)$ where $R = \text{diag}(\sigma^2_1, \ldots, \sigma^2_m)$ is the covariance matrix.

2.2 State Estimator

The basic SE problem is to find the best $n$-dimensional state $x$ for the measurement model (1) in a weighted least square (WLS) sense. Defining the residual vector $r(x) = z - h(x)$, we can write the WLS problem as

$$\min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} J(x) = \frac{1}{2} (x^T R^{-1} r(x))$$

such that $g(x) = 0$

$$s(x) \leq 0,$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where the inequality constraints generally model saturation limits, while the equality constraints are used to include target setpoints and to ensure physical laws such as zero power injection transition buses, e.g., transformers, and zero power flow in disconnected branches. Such data used in the equality constraints is often seen as pseudo-measurements. For sake of simplicity, we will present the solution to the unconstrained optimization problem.

The unconstrained WLS problem is posed as

$$\min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} J(x) = \frac{1}{2} (x^T R^{-1} r(x)).$$

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The SE yields a state estimate \( \hat{x} \) as a minimizer to this problem. The solution \( \hat{x} \) can be found using the Gauss-Newton method which solves the so called normal equations:

\[
(H^T(x^k)R^{-1}H(x^k))(\Delta x^k) = H^T(x^k)R^{-1}r(x^k),
\]

for \( k = 0, 1, \ldots \), where

\[
H(x^k) := \frac{dh(x)}{dx} \bigg|_{x=x^k}
\]

is called the Jacobian matrix of the measurement model \( h(x) \). For an observable power network, the measurement Jacobian matrix \( H(x^k) \) is full column rank. Consequently, the matrix \( (H^T(x^k)R^{-1}H(x^k)) \) in (3) is positive definite and the Gauss-Newton step generates a descent direction, i.e., for the direction \( \Delta x^k = x^{k+1} - x^k \) the condition \( \nabla J(x^k)^T\Delta x^k < 0 \) is satisfied.

**Remark 1.** Henceforth we consider the covariance matrix \( R \) to be the identity matrix, for simplicity, i.e., all measurements have unitary weights.

For notational convenience, throughout the next sections we will use \( H(x^k) \) as \( H \), \( \Delta x^k \) as \( \Delta x \), and \( r(x^k) = z - h(x^k) \) as \( r \).

### 2.3 Decoupled State Estimation

A useful observation in electric power networks is that of active-reactive decoupling, i.e., the active measurements \( z_P \) (resp. reactive measurement \( z_Q \)) predominantly affect the phase angles \( \theta \) (resp. the voltage magnitudes \( V \)). In the decoupled state estimation, the approximate values of the corrections \( \Delta \theta \) and \( \Delta V \) are then not computed simultaneously, but independently Wu [1990].

Following (3), the correction to state estimate \( \Delta x = (\Delta \theta^T, \Delta V^T)^T \) at each iteration can be obtained from the weighted measurement residual \( r = (r_P^T, r_Q^T)^T \) as the solution to the overdetermined system

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
H_{P0} & H_{PV} \\
H_{Q0} & H_{QV}
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
\Delta \theta \\
\Delta V
\end{pmatrix}
= 
\begin{pmatrix}
r_P \\
r_Q
\end{pmatrix},
\]

where the submatrices \( H_{P0} \) and \( H_{PV} \) correspond to active measurements and \( H_{Q0} \) and \( H_{QV} \) correspond to reactive measurements. The traditional version of fast decoupled state estimation is based on the following decoupled normal equations, where the coupling submatrices \( H_{PV} \) and \( H_{QV} \) have been set to zero:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta \theta^k &= H_{P0}^T r_P(\theta^k, V^k), \\
\Delta V^k &= H_{Q0}^T r_Q(\theta^k, V^k).
\end{align*}
\]

Equations (5) are alternately solved for \( \Delta \theta^k \) and \( \Delta V^k \), where the mismatches \( r_P \) and \( r_Q \) are evaluated at the latest estimates. The submatrices \( H_{P0} \) and \( H_{Q0} \) are evaluated at flat start and branch series resistances are ignored in forming \( H_{P0} \). By flat start we mean the power network’s state in which all voltage magnitudes are 1 pu and all phase angles are 0.

### 2.4 Bad Data Detection

The measurement residual when random bad data is present is characterized as follows. Assume there are no measurement errors, i.e. \( z = h(x) \), and that the SE has converged through the Gauss-Newton method. Recalling that \( r(\hat{x}) = z - h(\hat{x}) \), from (3) we see that the estimate sensitivity matrix is given by \( \frac{\partial r}{\partial x} = (H^T H)^{-1}H^T \). Furthermore, we conclude that the weighted residual sensitivity matrix is \( \frac{\partial r}{\partial x} = I - \frac{\partial h(x)}{\partial x} \frac{\partial x}{\partial r} = I - H(H^T H)^{-1}H^T \). Thus for small measurement errors \( \epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(0, I) \) we have the following weighted measurement residual

\[
r = Sc,
\]

where \( S = I - H(H^T H)^{-1}H^T \).

Through BDD the SE detects measurements corrupted by errors whose statistical properties exceed the presumed standard deviation or mean. This is achieved by hypothesis tests using the statistical properties of the weighted measurement residual (6). We now introduce one of the BDD hypothesis tests widely used in practice, the largest normalized residual test.

**Largest normalized residual test** From (6), we note that \( r \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \Omega) \) with \( \Omega = S \). Now consider the normalized residual vector

\[
r^N = D^{-1/2}r,
\]

with \( D \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times m} \) being a diagonal matrix defined as \( D = \text{diag}(\Omega) \). In the absence of bad data each element \( r_i^N, i = 1, \ldots, m \) of the normalized residual vector then follows a normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance, \( r_i^N \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1), \forall i = 1, \ldots, m \). Thus, bad data could be detected by checking if \( r_i^N \) follows \( \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \). This can be posed as a hypothesis test for each element \( r_i^N \)

\[
H_0 : \mathbb{E}\{r_i^N\} = 0, \quad H_1 : \mathbb{E}\{|r_i^N|\} > 0.
\]

For this particular case, as shown in Monticelli [1999], the largest normalized residual (LNR) test corresponds to a threshold test where the threshold \( \tau \) is computed for a given false alarm rate and \( H_0 \) is accepted if

\[
\|D^{-1/2}r\|_{\infty} \leq \tau,
\]

and rejected otherwise.

### 3. STEALTHY DECEPTION ATTACKS

Using the theory and models described in the previous section, we present the framework used throughout the next sections to study the cyber security of SCADA EMS software and algorithms.

#### 3.1 Attacker Model

The goal of a stealthy deception attacker is to compromise the telemetered measurements available to the SE such that: 1) The SE algorithm converges; 2) The attack remains undetected by the BDD scheme; and 3) For the targeted set of measurements, the estimated values at convergence are close to the compromised ones introduced by the attacker.

Let the corrupted measurement be denoted \( z^a \). We assume the following additive attack model

\[
z^a = z + a,
\]

where \( a \in \mathbb{R}^m \) is the attack vector introduced by the attacker, see also Fig. 1. The vector \( a \) has zero entries for uncompromised measurements.
The BDD scheme for SE is based on a threshold test. Thus the attacker’s action will be undetected by the BDD scheme provided that the following condition holds:

2) The measurement residual under attack \( r^a := r(\hat{x}^a) = z^a - h(\hat{x}^a) \), satisfies the condition (8).

We will occasionally use the notation \( \hat{x}^a(z^a) \) to emphasize the dependence on \( z^a \).

Finally, consider that the attacker aims at corrupting measurement \( i \). This means the attacker would like the estimated measurement \( z^e := h(\hat{x}^e(z^e)) \) to be equal to the actual corrupted measurement \( z^a_1 \). Therefore, we arrive at the following condition which will additionally govern the synthesis of attack vector \( a \):

3) The attack vector \( a \) is chosen such that \( |z^a_1 - \hat{z}^a_1| = 0 \).

The aim of a stealthy attacker is then to find and apply an attack \( a \) that satisfies conditions 1), 2), and 3). This problem can be posed as

\[
\text{find } a \quad \text{s.t. } a \in \mathcal{G} \cap \mathcal{C} \cap \mathcal{U},
\]

where \( \mathcal{G} \) is the set of goals in condition 3), \( \mathcal{C} \) the set of constraints ensuring condition 1) is met and that no protected or pseudo-measurements are corrupted, and \( \mathcal{U} \) the set of stealthy attacks satisfying condition 2).

3.2 Security Metric

In general a stealthy attack requires the corruption of more measurements than the targeted one, see Liu et al. [2009] and Sandberg et al. [2010]. Such requirement relates to the fact that a stealthy attack must have the attack vector \( a \) fitting the measurement model.

Considering that the system’s state is \( x^* \) and the attacks are sufficiently small, the measurement model can be linearized around \( x^* \), obtaining

\[
z = \frac{dh(x)}{dx} \bigg|_{x=x^*} (x^* + c) = H(x^* + c),
\]

where \( c \) is the perturbation added to \( x^* \). Previous results show that the class of stealthy attacks for this linear model is characterized by \( a \in \text{Im}(H) \), which is equivalent to have \( a = Hc \), for some \( c \neq 0 \). Based on this linear model, we present a security metric \( \alpha_k \) for each measurement \( k \). This metric corresponds to the minimum cost of a valid attack satisfying (10) and targeting to corrupt measurement \( k \) by adding it one unit, i.e., \( a_k = 1 \). It is computed by solving the problem

\[
\alpha_k = \min_a \|a\|_0 \quad \text{s.t. } a \in \mathcal{G} \cap \mathcal{C} \cap \mathcal{U},
\]

where here \( a \in \mathcal{G} \) corresponds to having \( a_k = 1 \), \( a \in \mathcal{C} \) to \( a_i = 0 \), \( \forall i \) if measurement \( i \) is a pseudo-measurement, and \( a \in \mathcal{U} \) to \( a \in \text{Im}(H) \). Note that \( \| \cdot \|_0 \) is a pseudo-norm corresponding to the cardinality, i.e., number of non-zero entries, of the argument. Hence the cost \( \alpha_k \) corresponds to the minimum number of sensors that need to be corrupted for a valid attack.

3.3 Limitations of Linear Policies

In this section we comment on the limitations of the linear attack policies described in Section 3.2. Recall that the core of the linear policies is to have \( a \in \text{Im}(H) \). Two main limitations arise from this policy, which are now discussed.

Varying operating conditions. The power network is a dynamical system and its state is frequently changing. Thus it might be the case that the attacker has previously obtained a linear model \( \hat{H} \) for a state \( \tilde{x} \) and the attack is performed only when the system is in a different state \( x^* \) where the linear approximation is \( H \). Hence for small attack vectors or for cases where \( x^* \approx \tilde{x} \), the residual will be small and the attack may pass undetected. For larger attacks, however, this might not hold. These scenarios can be analyzed using the framework presented in Teixeira et al. [2010]

One interesting fact to observe is that, under certain assumptions, the attack vector \( a \) and the security metric \( \alpha \) will be the same, independently of the system’s state. We now present a useful lemma and the required assumptions to formulate this result.

Lemma 1. Consider an optimal attack \( a^* \) that is undetectable with respect to \( H \), i.e., \( a^* \in \text{Im}(H) \) and has minimum cardinality. Denote by \( U \) the set of measurements not affected by \( a^* \), i.e., \( a^* = 0 \), \( \forall i \in U \) and \( a^*_i \neq 0 \), \( \forall i \notin U \). Let the Jacobian matrix be partitioned as \( H = [H^U, H^G] \). Recalling that \( n \) is the number of states and that \( \text{rank}(H) = n \), we have \( \text{rank}(H_U) = n - 1 \), and for every \( i \notin U \) we have \( \text{rank}(H_{U \cup \{i\}}) = n \).

Proof. See Dán and Sandberg [2010].

Assumption 1. For any measurement element \( z_i \), we have \( \frac{\partial h_i(x)}{\partial x_j} \bigg|_{x=x^*} = 0 \) if and only if \( \frac{\partial h_i(x)}{\partial x_j} \bigg|_{x=\hat{x}} = 0 \) for all \( j = 1, \ldots, n \).

Proposition 2. Denote \( F \) as the set of power flow measurements. Consider \( H = H_{\theta \theta}(\theta) \) and \( \hat{H} = H_{\theta \theta}(\theta) \), and let \( a \) be a stealthy deception attack vector with respect to \( H \). Denote the set of measurements not corrupted by \( a \) as \( U \). Then for all the line parameter perturbations and state changes from \( \theta^* \) to \( \theta \) that satisfy Assumption 1 and do not affect measurements \( j \in F \setminus U \), we have that \( a \) is also a stealthy attack with respect to \( \hat{H} \).

Proof. In the following we consider the matrix \( H_{\theta \theta} \) and use \( H \) instead to simplify the notation. We consider a perturbation in the linear model, e.g., due to varying operating conditions, such that for a measurement \( k \in F \) corresponding to a transmission line we have \( \hat{H}_k = bH_k \). Let us denote the buses at the two ends of the transmission line by \( k_1 \) and \( k_2 \). For the power injection at bus \( k_1 \) (closest to measurement \( k \)) we have \( \hat{H}_{k_1} = H_{k_1} + (b-1)H_k \), for bus \( k_2 \) we have \( \hat{H}_{k_2} = H_{k_2} - (b-1)H_k \). In the following we show that if \( k \in F \setminus U \), then for every \( a \in \text{Im}(H) \) there is \( \hat{a} \in \text{Im}(\hat{H}) \) such that \( a = \hat{a} \). Since this also holds for minimum cardinality attack vectors, we have that the security metric \( \alpha \) is the same for both linearized models.

For the case when \( k \in U \) we can prove the proposition by performing elementary row operations on \( \hat{H}_U \). If \( k_1 \in U \) we subtract \( (b-1)/b \hat{H}_k \) from \( \hat{H}_{k_1} \). We proceed similarly for \( k_2 \). Finally, we divide \( \hat{H}_k \) by \( b \). Clearly, after these operations we obtained \( \hat{H}_U \), which, following Lemma 1, proves that \( \text{rank}(\hat{H}_U) = n - 1 \). Observe that since we used elementary operations ensuring condition 1) is met and that no constraints ensuring condition 1) is met and that no protected or pseudo-measurements are corrupted, and \( \mathcal{U} \) the set of stealthy attacks satisfying condition 2).
row operations, the kernel of $\hat{H}_U$ is the same as that of $H_U$. Consequently, the same attack vectors can be used despite the perturbation of the model, i.e., $a \in \text{Im}(H) \cap \text{Im}(\hat{H})$. ■

Hence we conclude that if the state or parameter perturbations do not affect power flow measurements compromised by the attack before the change, then the same attack vector is still valid after the parameter or state change. Note that this is ensured if the measurements affected by the parameter change are far from the region of the network where the attack is performed, indicating that attacks can be performed locally in the power network.

**Saturation limits.** The linear measurement model (11) is obtained by linearizing the nonlinear model (1) at a given state $x^*$ and so the linear model only approximates the nonlinear one well in a region close to $x^*$. This fact is particularly important when the saturation occurs. From considering (11) alone we do not have any limits on the size of $a = Hc$. However, the nonlinear model clearly shows that the measurements have saturation limits. For instance, disregarding the line and shunt conductances $g_{ij}$ and $g_{si}$ we have $P_{ij} = -V_i V_j b_{ij} \sin(\theta_{ij})$, where we see that the theoretical maximum for this power flow is given by $P_{ij} = -V_i V_j b_{ij}$. Hence for a stealthy attack it is not enough to require that $a \in \text{Im}(H)$ but it is also essential to impose saturation limits on the attacked measurements, included in the set of constraints $C$, in general reducing the set of valid attacks.

4. EXPERIMENTS ON THE SCADA EMS SYSTEM

During the previous sections we referred to recent work where the authors analyzed stealthy deception attacks on SE based on linearized models and derived a new result characterizing operating condition changes for which stealthy attacks remain valid. However, the results obtained so far do not clarify how sensitive the real SCADA EMS software is to these attacks or if a system operator should even care about these scenarios. In this section we present the results obtained by carrying out a stealthy deception attack on a real SCADA EMS software. By analyzing these results, we hope to answer the previous open questions and also to provide recommendations to increase the security of SCADA EMS software against deception attacks. Before analyzing the results, we briefly describe the experimental setup.

4.1 Experimental Setup

The software was supplied with the test network presented in Fig. 2, similar to the IEEE 39 bus network. This network consists of 14 substations and the bus-branch model has 27 buses and 40 branches. Several measurements are available at each substation, which are kept in the software database. We have used a static network simulator to carry out the data corruption by directly changing the measurement data in the database. The presented results thus relate to data corruption attacks and the consequences of such attacks on the EMS software components.

Specific EMS components, such as SE and BDD, are configured with unitary weights for all the measurements. The SE solves the nonlinear weighted least-squares problem using the fast-decoupled algorithm with equality constraints, while the BDD algorithm uses the LNR test. Both approaches correspond to standard algorithms presented in Section 2.

As described in previous sections, some information about the power network is needed to compute stealthy deception attacks. Here we consider a particular class of such information, namely the bus-branch model of the network. In this experiment, we exported this information to MATLAB using the MATPOWER toolbox, Zimmerman et al. [2009]. A simplified attack was considered in which only the DC model of the network was used. This corresponds to including only active power measurements in the set of corrupted measurement data, disregarding the reactive measurements, the current operating state, the coupling between the active and reactive power, the line conductances, and the shunt admittances. Hence all voltage magnitudes were assumed to be 1 pu and the phase-angles 0. Only a simplified version of the $H_{F9}$ submatrix in (4) was used, hereby denoted $H_{DC}$.

The algorithm in Dän and Sandberg [2010] was used to compute the security metrics for each measurement.
Table 1. Example: adding 100MW to target measurement 33

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement index, ( k )</th>
<th>Normalized attack vector, ( \bar{a}_k ) (MW)</th>
<th>Correct value (MW), ( z_k^* )</th>
<th>False value (MW), ( z_k^\ast )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1005.7041</td>
<td>965.7042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>-0.7774</td>
<td>157.8541</td>
<td>80.1103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.9665</td>
<td>507.7171</td>
<td>604.3638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.7439</td>
<td>40.0006</td>
<td>314.3911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-14.7971</td>
<td>85.2029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.7774</td>
<td>-123.3764</td>
<td>-45.6327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>-0.9665</td>
<td>-334.8826</td>
<td>-431.5293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information regarding which measurements were assumed to be tamper-proof, i.e. pseudo-measurements, was taken in account.

The result is presented in Fig. 3. Given the current configuration of the SCADA EMS, specifically which measurements are available, we computed the security metric \( \alpha_k \) (the red full circles) as defined in Section 3.2. We see that the result is very heterogeneous. Recalling that \( \alpha_k \) is the minimum number of measurements needed to perform a stealthy attack on measurement \( k \), we conclude that measurements with low \( \alpha_k \) are relatively easily attacked while the ones with \( \alpha_k = \infty \) are fully protected.

Increasing the redundancy of the system by adding more measurements to the SCADA system increases the security level, as we see by looking at how \( \alpha_k \) is larger than \( \alpha_k \), since \( \alpha_k \) is the security metric computed assuming that all possible measurements are being taken. However, note that this does not guarantee full protection, as all measurements with finite \( \alpha_k \) still have finite \( \alpha_k \).

4.2 Attack Scenario

To conduct our experiment we considered measurement number 33, corresponding to the active power flow on the tie-line between TROY and BLOO substations, to be the target measurement that the attacker desires to corrupt. In order to do so without being detected, the attacker needs to perform a coordinated attack by corrupting the value of other power measurements. Following the framework presented in Section 3, the set of such malicious changes is encoded in the attack vector \( \bar{a}_k \), and \( z^a \) follows from (9).

Using \( H_{DC} \), we computed the additive normalized attack vector required to stealthily change the target measurement by 1 MW, presented in Table 1. As seen in Fig. 3, such attack only corrupts 7 measurements in total, which are taken from 5 substations, namely TROY, BLOO, JUNE, MONR, and CROS, all situated in the right side of Fig. 2. Hence we see that to stealthily attack a single measurement, a local coordinated attack suffices, even for such a large system. Additionally, as discussed in Dinh and Sandberg [2010], note that usually all measurements within a given substation are gathered at a single RTU. This means that by breaking into the substation’s RTU the attacker gains access to all those measurements, so we can argue that although 7 measurements need to be corrupted, only 5 RTUs need to be compromised.

4.3 Experimental Results

The normalized attack vector \( \bar{a}_k \), whose non-zero entries are shown in Table 1, was used to corrupt the measurement data according to the attacker’s objective. For instance, in Table 1 we can see the correct value of the compromised measurements, denoted by \( z^* \), and the false values sent to the control center, \( z^a \), when the objective was to induce a bias of 100MW in the target measurement, having \( z^a = z^* + 100 \hat{a} \).

In Fig. 4 we show the results obtained by performing stealthy deception attacks as described before and naive deception attacks where only the target measurement is compromised. In both cases, the bias in the target measurement was sequentially increased by 10MW at each step. From these results we see that the naive attack was undetected up to a bias of 20MW, while for bias above 30MW this attack was detected and the compromised measurement removed. The coordinated stealthy attack, however, remained undetected for all the bias values showed in the figure. Furthermore we see that the naive attack did not influence the estimate as much as the stealthy one. For the stealthy attacks relationship between the false and the estimated values is an almost unitary slope.

Table 2 shows the results obtained for large bias, where the attacks were performed sequentially with steps of 50MW. We observe that the stealthy attacks were successful with no BDD alarm triggered up to a bias of 150MW, beyond which the SE no longer converged.

Although the SE did not converge for attacks above 200MW, it is still surprising to see that attacks based on
the linearized model as large as 150MW are successful. To better understand what such quantity indicates, note that the nominal value of the targeted tie-line is 260MW. Thus the attack was able to induce a bias of more than 50% of the nominal value, which reveals that the SCADA EMS software is indeed sensitive to stealthy deception attacks. Furthermore, notice that the number of warnings given by the CA component increase with the size of the attack. The increased number of CA warnings could lead the operator to take corrective actions. Therefore, we conclude that operators and utilities should care about these scenarios.

We also want to highlight that these results were achieved with a simplified linear model where several parameters, including the correct operating conditions and cross-coupling effects between active and reactive measurements, were disregarded. However in these scenarios we assumed the attacker had a large amount of resources such as a rather detailed knowledge regarding the network model, the available measurements, and the pseudo-measurements, and access to several RTUs. Most likely, an attacker with such resources could find easier alternative attacks on the power network than the one considered in this paper.

5. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we presented a comprehensive framework to analyze and study a class of stealthy deception attacks specifically targeting the SE component of SCADA EMS software through measurement data corruption. This framework provides attacker and attack cost models, possible attack synthesis policies, and system security metrics. Results obtained using this framework indicate that local attacks are possible. The system security metric can be used by the utility to strengthen the security of the system by allocation of new sensors. Some limitations of the linear attack policies were briefly discussed. To validate this framework, we took a novel approach and conducted a set of deception attacks to a state-of-the-art SCADA EMS software. The results obtained by this experiment show that computations based on linear models of the system provide valid attacks that successfully corrupt the target measurements without triggering any BDD alarms. The results also indicate that linear models can be used for large attacks as well, although otherwise expected. Additionally, we showed that besides the measurement model, information concerning pseudo-measurements and saturation limits is needed for a successful stealthy attack. This fact can be used by the utility to protect the system. This study also shows that improved BDD schemes and methods to ensure measurement and data protection are desirable.

Table 2. Results from the stealthy attack for large bias

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target bias, False value Estimate</th>
<th>#BDD Alarms</th>
<th>#CA Alarms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$a_{33}$ (MW), $z_{33} \hat{a}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>-14.8</td>
<td>136.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>36.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>85.2</td>
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<td>150</td>
<td>135.2</td>
<td>137.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>185.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REFERENCES


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