



KUNGL  
TEKNISKA  
HÖGSKOLAN

**International**

**Master Program**

**in System-on-Chip Design**

**Software redundancy**

## **Software fault-tolerance**

- Fault-tolerance in software domain is not as well understood as fault-tolerance in hardware domain
  - Controversial opinions exist on whether reliability can be used to evaluate software.
  - Software failures are mostly due to the activation of design faults by specific input sequences.
  - This makes the reliability of a software module dependent on the environment that generates input to the module over the time.
    - Ariane 5 rocket accident

## Software fault-tolerance

- Many current techniques for software fault tolerance attempt to leverage the experience of hardware redundancy schemes
  - software N-version programming closely resembles hardware N-modular redundancy
  - recovery blocks use the concept of retrying the same operation in expectation that the problem is resolved after the second try.

## Problems

- Traditional hardware fault tolerance techniques were developed to fight
  - permanent components faults primarily
  - transient faults caused by environmental factors secondarily.
- They do not offer sufficient protection against design and specification faults, which are dominant in software.

## Design diversity

- By simply triplicating a software module and voting on its outputs we cannot tolerate a fault in the module because all copies have identical faults
- **Design diversity** technique has to be applied.
  - requires creation of diverse and equivalent specifications so that programmers can design software which do not share common faults
  - this is widely accepted to be a difficult task

## Problems

- A software system usually has a very large number of states
  - a collision avoidance system required on most commercial aircrafts in the U.S. has 1040 states
- Software states do not exhibited adequate regularity to allow grouping them into equivalence classes.
  - Such regularity is common for digital hardware

## Problems

- The large number of states implies that only a very small part of software system can be verified for correctness.
  - Traditional testing and debugging methods are not feasible for large systems.
  - Formal methods promise higher coverage, however, they are very complex
    - a specification using formal logic may be of the same size or even larger than the code.
- Due to incomplete verification, many design faults are not diagnosed and are not removed from the software

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## Single- and multi-version techniques

- Software fault-tolerance techniques can be divided into two groups:
  - single-version
  - multi-version
- Single version techniques aim to improve fault-tolerant capabilities of a single software module
  - fault detection, containment and recovery mechanisms
- Multi-version techniques employ redundant software modules, developed following design diversity rules

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## Redundancy allocation

- A number of possibilities has to be examined:
  - at which level the redundancy need to be provided
    - redundancy can be applied to a procedure, or to a process, or to the whole software system
  - which modules are to be made redundant
    - usually, the components which have high probability of faults are chosen to be made redundant.
- The increase in complexity caused by redundancy can be quite severe and may diminish the dependability improvement

## Single-version techniques

- Single version techniques add to a single software module a number of functional capabilities that are unnecessary in a fault-free environment.
  - fault detection, fault containment and fault recovery
- Software structure and actions are modified to be able to detect a fault, isolate it and prevent the propagation of its effect throughout the system.

## Fault detection techniques

- The goal is to determine that a fault has occurred within a system.
- Various types of acceptance tests are used to detect faults
  - the result of a program is subjected to a test
  - if the result passes the test, the program continues its execution
  - a failed test indicates a fault

## Acceptance test

- Acceptance test is most effective if it can be calculated in a simple way and if it is based on criteria that can be derived independently of the program application.
- The existing techniques include
  - timing checks
  - coding checks
  - reversal checks
  - reasonableness checks
  - structural checks

## Timing checks

- Timing checks are applicable to system whose specification include timing constrains
- Based on these constrains, checks are developed to indicate a deviation from the required behavior.
  - Watchdog timer is an example of a timing check
  - Watchdog timers are used to monitor the performance of a system and detect lost or locked out modules.

## Coding checks

- Coding checks are applicable to system whose data can be encoded using information redundancy techniques
- Usually used in cases when the information is merely transported from one module to another without changing it content.
  - Arithmetic codes can be used to detect errors in arithmetic operations

## Reversal checks

- In some system, it is possible to reverse the output values and to compute the corresponding input values.
- A reversal checks compares the actual inputs of the system with the computed ones.
  - a disagreement indicates a fault.

## Reasonableness checks

- Reasonableness checks use semantic properties of data to detect fault.
  - a range of data can be examined for overflow or underflow to indicate a deviation from system's requirements
    - maximum withdrawal sum in bank's teller machine
    - address generated by a computer should lie inside the range of available memory



## Structural checks

- Structural checks are based on known properties of data structures
  - a number or elements in a list can be counted, or links and pointer can be verified
- Structural checks can be made more efficient by adding redundant data to a data structure,
  - attaching counts on the number of items in a list, or adding extra pointers

## Fault containment techniques

- Fault containment in software can be achieved by modifying the structure of the system and by putting a set of restrictions defining which actions are permissible within the system
- Techniques for fault containment:
  - modularization
  - partitioning
  - system closure
  - atomic actions

## Modularization

- Software system is divided into modules with few or no common dependencies between them
- Modularization attempts to prevent the propagation of faults
  - by limiting the amount of communication between modules to carefully monitored messages
  - by eliminating shared resources

## Partitioning

- Modular hierarchy of a software architecture is partitioned in horizontal or vertical dimensions
- **Horizontal partitioning** separates the major software functions into independent branches
  - The execution of the functions and the communication between them is done using control modules
- **Vertical partitioning** distributes the control and processing function in a top-down hierarchy.
  - High-level modules normally focus on control functions, while low-level modules perform processing

## System closure

- System closure technique is based on a principle that no action is permissible unless explicitly authorized
- In an environment with many restrictions and strict control all the interactions between the elements of the system are visible
  - prison
- It is easier to locate and disable any fault.

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## Atomic action

- An atomic action among a group of components in an activity in which the components interact exclusively with each other.
  - no interaction with the rest of the system
- Two possible outcomes of an atomic action:
  - it terminates normally
  - it is aborted upon a fault detection
- Fault containment area is defined and fault recovery is limited to atomic action components

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## Fault recovery techniques

- Once a fault is detected and contained, a system attempts to recover from the faulty state and regain operational status
  - If fault detection and containment mechanisms are implemented properly, the effects of the faults are contained within a particular set of modules at the moment of fault detection.
- The knowledge of fault containment region is essential for the design of effective fault recovery mechanism

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## Exception handling

- Exception handling is the interruption of normal operation to handle abnormal responses
- Possible events triggering the exceptions:
  - Interface exceptions
    - signaled by a module when it detects an invalid service request
  - Local exceptions
    - signaled by a module when its fault detection mechanism detects a fault
  - Failure exceptions
    - signaled by a module when it has detected that its fault recovery mechanism is unable to recover successfully

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
## Checkpoint and restart

- Most of the software faults are design faults, activated by some non-tested or unexpected input sequence.
  - resemble hardware intermittent faults: appear for a short period of time, then disappear, and then may appear again.
- Simply restarting the module is usually enough to successfully complete its execution

## Checkpoint and restart

- The module executing a program operates in combination with an acceptance test block which checks the correctness of the result
- If an fault is detected, a ``retry" signal is send to the module to re-initialize its state to the checkpoint state stored in the memory

## Checkpoint and restart recovery



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## Static checkpoints

- A static checkpoint takes a single snapshot of the system state at the beginning of the program execution and stores it in the memory.
  - If a fault is detected, the system returns to this state and starts the execution from the beginning.
  - Fault detection checks are placed at the output of the module

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## Dynamic checkpoints

- Dynamic checkpoints are created dynamically at various points during the execution
  - If a fault is detected, the system returns to the last checkpoint and continues the execution.
  - Fault detection checks need to be embedded in the code and executed before the checkpoints are created

## Static vs. dynamic

- In static approach, the expected time to complete the execution grows exponentially with the execution requirements.
  - static checkpointing is effective only if the processing requirement is relatively small.
- In dynamic approach, it is possible to achieve linear increase in execution time as the processing requirements grow

## Strategies for dynamic checkpointing

- Equidistant
  - places checkpoints at deterministic fixed time intervals
  - the time between checkpoints is chosen depending on the expected fault rate
- Modular
  - places checkpoints at the end of the sub-modules in a module, after the fault detection checks for the sub-module are completed
  - the execution time depends on the distribution of the sub-modules and expected fault rate
- Random

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## Advantages of restart recovery

- Conceptually simple
- Independent of the damage caused by a fault
- Applicable to unanticipated faults
- General enough to be used at multiple levels in a system

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## Problems of restart recovery

- Non-recoverable actions exist in some systems
  - these actions cannot be compensated by simply reloading the state and restarting the system
    - firing a missile
    - soldering a pair of wires
- The recovery from such actions can be done
  - by compensating for their consequences
    - undoing a solder
  - by delaying their output until after additional confirmation checks are completed
    - do a friend-or-foe confirmation before firing

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
## Process pairs

- Two identical versions of the software are run on separate processors
- First the primary processor, is active.
  - It executes the program and sends the checkpoint information to the secondary processor, Processor 2.
- If a fault is detected, the primary processor is switched off. The secondary processor loads the last checkpoint as its starting state and continues the execution

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## Process pairs



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## Multi-version techniques

- Multi-version techniques use two or more versions the same software module, which satisfy design diversity requirements.
  - different teams, different coding languages or different algorithms can be used to maximize the probability that all the versions do not have common faults


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## Recovery blocks

- Combines checkpoint and restart approach with standby sparing redundancy scheme
- n different implementations of the same program
  - Only one of the versions is active
  - If an error is detected by the acceptance test, a retry signal is sent to the switch
  - The system is rolled back to the state stored in the checkpoint memory and the execution is switched to another module

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## Recovery blocks



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## Recovery blocks

- Similarly to cold and hot standby sparing, different version can be executed either serially, or concurrently
  - Serial execution may require the use of checkpoints to reload the state before the next version is executed
  - The cost in time of trying multiple versions serially may be too expensive, especially for a real-time system.
  - A concurrent system requires n redundant hardware modules, a communications network to connect them and the use of input and state consistency algorithms.

## Recovery blocks

- If all n versions are tried and failed, the module invokes the exception handler to communicate to the rest of the system a failure to complete its function
- Recovery blocks technique heavily depends on design diversity


## N-version programming

- Resembles N-modular hardware redundancy
- N different software implementations of a module are executed concurrently.
- The selection algorithm (voter) decides which of the answers is correct
  - a voter is application independent
  - this is an advantage over recovery block fault detection mechanism, requiring application dependent acceptance tests

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## N-version programming



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## Voters

- There are many different types of voters:
  - formalized majority voter
    - selects majority
  - generalized median voter
    - selects the median of the values
  - formalized plurality voter
    - partitions the set of outputs based on metric equality and selects the output from the largest group
  - weighted averaging
    - combines the outputs in a weighted average

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## Voting

- The selection algorithms are normally developed taking into account the consequences of error
  - For applications where reliability is important, the selection algorithm should be designed so that the selected result is correct with a very high probability
  - If availability is an issue, the selection algorithm is expected to produce an output even it is incorrect
  - For applications where safety the main concern, the selection algorithm is required to correctly distinguish the erroneous version and mask its results

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
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## N self-checking programming

- N self-checking programming combines recovery block concept with N version programming
- The checking is performed either by using acceptance tests, or by using comparison.
- Examples of applications of N self-checking programming:
  - Lucent ESS-5 phone switch
  - Airbus A-340 airplane


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## N self-checking programming using acceptance tests



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## N self-checking programming using comparison



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## Comparison

- N self-checking programming using acceptance tests
  - The use of separate acceptance test for each version is the main difference of this technique from recovery blocks
- N self-checking programming using comparison
  - resembles triplex-duplex hardware redundancy
  - An advantage over N self-checking programming using acceptance tests is that the application independent decision algorithm is used for fault detection

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## Design diversity

- The most critical issue in multi-version software fault tolerance techniques is assuring independence between the different versions of software through design diversity
- Software systems are vulnerable to common design faults if they are developed by the same design team, by applying the same design rules and using the same software tools

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## Design diversity

- Decision to be made when developing a multi-version software system include
  - which modules are to be made redundant
    - usually less reliable modules are chosen
  - the level of redundancy
    - procedure, process, whole system
  - the required number of redundant versions
  - the required diversity
    - diverse specification, algorithm, code, programming language, testing technique
  - rules of isolation between the development teams

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## Software testing

- **Software testing** is the process of executing a program with the intent of finding errors
- Two types of software testing:
  - **Functional testing** compares test program behavior against its specification
  - **Structural testing** checks the internal structure of a program for errors

## Structural testing

- The effectiveness of structural testing is expressed in terms of **test coverage metrics** which measure the fraction of code exercised by tests
  - Statement coverage
  - Branch coverage
  - Path coverage

## Statement coverage

- **Statement coverage** requires that each executable statement of a program is followed during a test
- **Advantages:**
  - Can be applied directly to object code and does not require processing source code
- **Disadvantages:**
  - Insensitive to some control structures, logical AND or OR operators, and switch labels

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## Example

```
x = 0;  
if (condition)  
    x = x + 1;  
y = 10/x;
```

- If there is no test case which causes **condition** to evaluate false, the error in this code will not be detected in spite of 100% statement coverage
- The error will appear only if **condition** evaluates false for some test case

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## Branch Coverage

- **Branch coverage** requires that each branch of a program is executed at least once during a test
- Advantages:
  - relative simplicity
- Disadvantages:
  - might miss some errors

## Example

```
if(condition1)
    x = 0;
else
    x = 2;
if(condition2)
    y = 10*x;
else
    y = 10/x;
```

- 100% branch coverage can be achieved by two tests:
  - both **condition1** and **condition2** evaluate true
  - both **condition1** and **condition2** evaluate false
- However, the error which occur when **condition1** evaluates true and **condition2** evaluates false is not detected

## Path coverage

- **Path coverage** requires that each of the possible paths through the program is followed during a test
- The most reliable metric, however, not applicable to large programs
  - the number of paths is exponential to the number of branches
- 100% branch coverage is a requirement of most software standards

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## Preliminaries


- A flowgraph is a directed graph  $G = (V, E, \text{entry}, \text{exit})$  where
  - $V$  is the set of vertices representing basic blocks of the program
  - $E \subseteq V \times V$  is the set of edges connecting the vertices
- **entry** and **exit** are two distinguished vertices of  $V$

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
## Example

```
b1;
while(b2)
  for(b3)
    b4;
    for(b5)
      if(b6) b7;
      else b8;
      if(b9) break;
      switch(b10) {
        case 1: while(b11) b12;
        case 2: if(b13) b14;
                 else continue;
        default: b15;
                  break;
      }
    b16;
  b17;
```



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
## Pre-dominators



- A vertex  $v$  **pre-dominates** a vertex  $u$  if every path from entry to  $u$  contains  $v$
- 4 pre-dominates 5
- 6 pre-dominates 7 and 8

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
## Post-dominators



- A vertex  $v$  **post-dominates** a vertex  $u$  if every path from  $u$  to exit contains  $v$
- 9 post-dominate 5
- 5 post-dominate 6

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
## Immediate dominators



- Vertex  $v$  is the **immediate pre-dominator** of  $u$ , if  $v$  pre-dominates  $u$  and every other pre-dominator of  $u$  pre-dominates  $v$ 
  - 1,2,3,4 pre-dominate 5
  - 4 is immediate
- unique
- edges  $(\text{idom}(v), v)$  form a tree rooted at entry


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## Pre-dominator tree



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## Post-dominator tree



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
## Statement Coverage

- We present a technique for finding a subset of flowgraph vertices, called **kernel**
- any set of tests which executes all vertices of the kernel executes all vertices of the flowgraph
- 100% statement coverage can be achieved by constructing a set of tests for the kernel

## Notation

- $L_{pre}$  denotes the set of **leaf** vertices of the pre-dominator tree of  $G$
- $L_{pre}^D$  contains all vertices of  $L_{pre}$  which **post-dominate** some vertex of  $L_{pre}$
- $L_{post}$  denotes the set of **leaf** vertices of the post-dominator tree of  $G$
- $L_{post}^D$  contains all vertices of  $L_{post}$  which **pre-dominate** some vertex of  $L_{post}$

## Example




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## Properties of kernels

- The sets  $L_{pre} - L^D_{pre}$  and  $L_{post} - L^D_{post}$  are minimum kernels for  $G$
- Minimum kernels can be computed in  $O(|V|+|E|)$  time

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## Example



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## Branch Coverage

- The kernel-based technique can be similarly applied to branch coverage by constructing pre- and post-dominator trees for the edges of the flowgraph instead of for its vertices
- 100% branch coverage can be achieved by constructing a set of tests for the kernel

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## Summary of structural testing

- Technique for structural testing based on kernel computation
- Any set of tests which executes all vertices of the kernel executes all vertices of the flowgraph
- 100% coverage can be achieved by constructing a set of tests for the kernel

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## Summary

- Basic techniques for achieving fault tolerance
  - hardware redundancy
  - information redundancy
  - time redundancy
  - software redundancy
- Often a combination of techniques is used, depending on application

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## Summary

- It is important to be able to compare how good are two or more different approaches for a particular application, without implementing them
- Results of comparison lead to trade-offs and modification of the design
- This is done using evaluation methods

## Next lecture

- Fault tolerance in VLSI systems (not covered in the text book)